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Abstract. Retargeting ads are increasingly prevalent on the Internet
as their effectiveness has been shown to outperform conventional tar-
geted ads. Retargeting ads are not only based on users’ interests, but
also on their intents, i.e. commercial products users have shown interest
in. Existing retargeting systems heavily rely on tracking, as retargeting
companies need to know not only the websites a user has visited but also
the exact products on these sites. They are therefore very intrusive, and
privacy threatening. Furthermore, these schemes are still sub-optimal
since tracking is partial, and they often deliver ads that are obsolete (be-
cause, for example, the targeted user has already bought the advertised
product).
This paper presents the first privacy-preserving retargeting ads system.
In the proposed scheme, the retargeting algorithm is distributed between
the user and the advertiser such that no systematic tracking is necessary,
more control and transparency is provided to users, but still a lot of tar-
geting flexibility is provided to advertisers. We show that our scheme,
that relies on homomorphic encryption, can be efficiently implemented
and trivially solves many problems of existing schemes, such as frequency
capping and ads freshness.
1 Introduction
In targeted advertising, companies track user online browsing activities to infer
user information, such as age, gender and interests, and then personalize ads.
Targeting helps advertisers to optimally allocate their advertising resources to
their most likely potential customers, and thus to increase their revenue. As a
result, companies have been constantly improving their tracking and ad person-
alizing technologies with the aim to enhance targeting performance.
Retargeting ads have been introduced in recent years with the aim to match
the exact user attention or previous online action. For example, a user who has
visited hotels.com looking for a hotel in Paris will very likely receive frequent
ads about this hotel during his subsequent browsing sessions, for instance on
accuweather.com. Advertisers (hotels.com in this case) aim to bring these cus-
tomers back to their sites by showing ads related to the products they previously
showed interest in. Retargeting ads have been shown to be significantly effective;
Criteo in particular confirmed that personalized retargeting ads perform 6 times
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better than general ads [26]. Increasingly, retargeting is becoming prevalent in
travel, real estate and financial services industries [1].
Retargeting advertisers, mostly commercial online stores (e.g., hotels.com),
often leverage a third party, called retargeter (e.g., Criteo), to handle the re-
targeting task. Retargeters track users on these stores to collect products that
they are interested in, and then select one to advertise to a user when (s)he
visits an ad-enabled website. This is beneficial to advertisers as they can out-
source the optimization of the whole advertising process to an external party
with dedicated resource and expertise. However, as users’ interested products
are centrally collected by third-party retargeters, this also poses significant pri-
vacy threats. For example, these products are shown to reveal users’ important
events in their life, such as being pregnant, getting divorced or graduating [27].
Compared to conventional tracking, where ad networks usually only collect urls
of sites visited by a user (e.g., hotels.com) to infer his interest categories (e.g.,
traveling), retargeting trackers also retrieve exact products on each page thereby
inferring more accurate information about the user (e.g., the city where he is
searching for a hotel).
There have been serious public concerns about the prevalence and resulting
privacy threats of retargeting. As observed by the author of a The New York
Times’s article [1]: “Retargeting has reached a level of precision that is leaving
consumers with the palpable feeling that they are being watched as they roam
the virtual aisles of online stores.” and “It illustrates that there is a commercial
surveillance system in place online that is sweeping in scope and raises privacy
and civil liberties issues”.
The natural reaction from the user community is to block trackers. There
are a bundle of tools for this purpose, such as AdBlockPlus [4], Ghostery [3],
DoNotTrackMe [6], TrackMeNot [5] and much more. In addition, privacy ad-
vocates proposed Do-Not-Track [2] initiative with the aim to help users notify
trackers of their non-tracking preference and to urge trackers to stop tracking
when receiving such notification. Unfortunately, these anti-tracking approaches
prevent targeted advertising and compromise the business model of the Inter-
net, which is mainly fostered by advertising revenue. The prevalence of these
initiatives potentially leads to a situation where no one benefits. For example,
advertisers cannot effectively promote their products and consequently lose sale
revenue, content providers lose advertising revenue and may stop providing free
content, and finally users do not receive useful ads and may have to pay for the
access to content which is currently free.
Alternatively, several research proposals [8][10] aimed to shift advertisers’ ad
personalizing algorithms to users’ devices, thus providing users with complete
control over their data. However, it is unclear in these approaches how the con-
fidentiality of these algorithms is guaranteed against users. In addition, these
proposals do not consider the Real-Time Bidding (RTB) protocol, which allows
trading ad spaces at real-time auctions on a per-ad-impression basis, in their
design. RTB is actually a major channel for retargeters to buy ad spaces.
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Contribution: We propose the first retargeting system which does not require
tracking. In this system, a client software operating at the user’s terminal col-
lects products on websites that the user has visited, and stores them locally. The
product selection algorithm is distributed between the client and the retargeter,
while an effective homomorphic scheme protects the algorithm’s confidential-
ity from the client. Specifically, the homomorphic encryption scheme allows the
client to perform some precomputation for the retargeter without learning how
exactly the retargeter selects the advertised products; these precomputation re-
sults are then sent to the retargeter in a way that does not leak any user private
information (e.g., IP address); and finally, the retargeter selects the final prod-
ucts to advertise to the user. Our scheme is compatible with today’s advertising
systems, and integrates RTB as part of its design.
The proposed scheme has several benefits over the existing retargeting scheme.
(1) It improves user privacy by preventing systematic tracking. (2) It provides
more transparency and control for users over their data which is used for retar-
geting. In particular, users can filter out privacy-sensitive products from adver-
tising. (3) It is more efficient than existing schemes since profiling is performed
locally, and is therefore based on higher quality data. Furthermore, in existing
systems, users frequently receive retargeting ads about products that are not
relevant anymore (e.g., they already bought them from another seller). This is
annoying to most users, yet inevitable, since advertisers do not always know
whether users have changed their intents or made a purchase. This problem is
trivially solved in our scheme since users can filter-out products that they are
no longer interested in. (4) It does not rely on cookie and tracking technologies,
and therefore works even if users use anti-tracking tools.
Organization: The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview
of the current retargeting system and related privacy risks. We then describe
the goals and security assumptions of the proposed scheme in Section 3. We
give an overview of the scheme in Section 4, and clarify the details in Section
5. A privacy analysis is presented in Section 6. The implementation and perfor-
mance evaluation are presented in Section 7. We discuss possible improvements
in Section 8, survey related work in Section 9 and conclude in Section 10.
2 Background
Before retargeting became prevalent, conventional targeted ad systems (e.g.,
Google Adsense) were often only interest-based: ad networks collected urls of
sites visited by users (e.g., hotels.com) to infer user interest categories (e.g.,
traveling) and used this information to deliver personalized ads.
By contrast, retargeting is much more effective (and also privacy-invasive):
retargeting trackers do not only attempt to identify user interests, but also aim
to get the exact products on each page, possibly with additional information such
as related user actions (e.g., search) and the point where the user suspended the
purchasing process. For instance, given a user visiting hotels.com, retargeters
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might learn that he is interested in a hotel in a certain district in Paris. In
addition, they can also infer whether the user only looks at this hotel, or has a
clear booking intent (the hotel is in a shopping cart), or already made a booking
(the hotel is in a booking confirmation page).
2.1 Retargeting Mechanism
There are five entities in a retargeting system: advertiser, publisher, ad exchange,
retargeter and user. Advertisers (e.g., hotels.fr) wish to promote their products
by showing ads to users. Publishers (e.g., nytimes.com) develop web pages pro-
viding content to users and sell ad spaces on their pages to advertisers. Ad
Exchanges (e.g., DoubleClick) connect ad buyers (advertisers or their repre-
sentatives) and sellers (publishers) in real-time transactions. Retargeters (e.g.,
Criteo) provide retargeting service to advertisers.
We illustrate how retargeting works with the following example. A user visits
maty.com, searches for an engagement ring (product), looks at its details and
then leaves the website without a purchase. Later on, he visits accuweather.com
and finds this engagement ring advertised to him on the page. In this scenario,
the owner of maty.com (advertiser) uses the retargeting service provided by a
retargeter, say Criteo, to retarget the user on publisher pages (accuweather.com
in this example). This retargeting process has two main phases: tracking (the
retargeter tracks users on maty.com) and delivering ads (the retargeter delivers
ads to users on accuweather.com). In what follows, we elaborate these two phases.
Tracking: The advertiser puts the retargeter’s tracking code on its pages and
encodes in each page the ids of products aimed for retargeting (e.g., an engage-
ment ring’s id: “ring123”). When a user visits such a page, the tracking code
sends his cookie (belonging to the retargeter’s domain) along with these product
ids to the retargeter. In addition, the advertiser can flexibly send additional user
information to the retargeter. For example, if the user performs a search, the
keyword and product ids on the resulting page could be sent to the retargeter. In
case the user visits his shopping cart, the quantities of products in the cart could
also be sent along with the product ids. This information serves a more accurate
targeting (e.g., targeting shopping cart abandoners). As a result of tracking, the
retargeter builds a list of potentially advertised products assigned to each user
cookie.
Delivering ads: The retargeter finds ad spaces on publisher pages (e.g., ac-
cuweather.com) mostly through the Real-Time Bidding (RTB) protocol. RTB
is provided by an Ad Exchange (ADX): publishers put the ADX’s advertising
code on their web pages; when a user visits such a page, the code sends an ad
request, which contains the ADX’s user cookie and the information about the
page, to the ADX. The ADX subsequently broadcasts these data in form of bid
requests to its registered bidders, including retargeters, for them to compete in
a real-time auction for the ad space.
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Upon receiving a bid request, each bidder recognizes its own user cookie from
the ADX’s cookie thanks to a cookie matching protocol [29]. Given the list of
products previously assigned to the user cookie, each retargeter selects some
products1 to be advertised to the user as well as the advertising price it would
pay. This selection is typically based on the products, the user profile, and the
page which displays ads.
ADX is often operated by giant firms, such as Google, Yahoo or Microsoft:
they manage huge online ad inventories and put them into real-time auctions in
order to maximize the revenue.
2.2 Privacy Concerns of Retargeting
There are serious privacy concerns related to the fact that products, which users
are interested in, are centrally collected by retargeters. Specifically, certain kinds
of products might immediately expose sensitive information: an engagement ring
reveals that the user likely intends to get married while its price implies his
financial capacity, a hotel booking reveals the user’s destination, a bank loan
reveals the user’s financial status, and so forth. In addition, research has shown
that users’ habits can be characterized by the products they consume for a
period, and that changing habits anticipate special events in their life (e.g.,
being pregnant, getting divorced or graduating) [27]. The inferred information
can be used by marketers to better suggest products to users, but can also
enable price or service discrimination [33]. Moreover, retargeting ads might reveal
users’ private actions, e.g., to their family members. This has been shown in a
practical case when a commercial coupon advertised to a father revealed that
his teenage daughter is pregnant [27]. Furthermore, all this private information
can be easily linked with user identity, as commercial websites often incentivize
users to provide their name, email address or telephone number, e.g., through a
fidelity program.
3 Goals and Assumptions
3.1 Goals
We introduce a novel retargeting system which preserves user privacy from re-
targeters. Specifically, our scheme ensures that retargeters cannot associate any
user information with user personal identity such as IP address (anonymity) and
cannot associate multiple pieces of such information with the same user (unlink-
ability). We also prevent any man-in-the-middle attack (possibly mounted by Ad
Exchanges) between users and retargeters that could aim at eavesdropping the
transmitted data (e.g., ads) to learn private information (e.g., list of products
visited by the user).
1 The retargeter can use the exact products that the user visited and/or suggest
relevant products.
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In addition, our scheme also protects the secrecy of retargeters which do
not want to reveal every detail of their ad selection algorithm even if it is dis-
tributed between the user and the retargeter. This is a challenging task since
the algorithm needs private user attributes (e.g., age, sex, or interest categories)
and also confidential data from the retargeter (e.g., the combination of user
attributes that yields higher clicking rate) as input.
While ensuring privacy, we also aim to keep the retargeting effectiveness
of today’s systems. Specifically, we provide retargeters with almost the same
input and flexibility for ad selection as they have today. Nevertheless, we cannot
compare the performance of our proposal with that of the current retargeting
system due to the lack of real data and details of today’s ad selection algorithms.
Hence, we leave this performance comparison for future work, and rather discuss
several possible improvements of our scheme.
3.2 Security Assumptions
Some related work [8][10] assume honest-but-curious parties, which abide by the
protocol rules but may misuse any information obtained in the protocol run. In
our work, we assume that the retargeter and the ad exchange can be active, i.e.,
they can also mount active attacks to break anonymity or unlinkability.
However, we assume that the ad exchange does not collude with the retar-
geter. The major goal of an ad exchange is to provide a fair market for trading
ads, not to break user privacy at all cost. Moreover, ad exchanges are often large
companies with reputation (e.g., Google or Facebook), which unlikely take the
risk to collude with an external party. In addition, most of their privacy policies
actually contain non-collusion terms making them subject to legal action. Enti-
ties which do not have such privacy statement could be excluded by the client
software by maintaining a blacklist of them.
On the client side, we assume that the user trusts the client software. The
client software can be open-source (e.g., a browser plugin), and therefore can be
easily audited by a trusted party. Finally, the client can be malicious towards
retargeters. For example, a retargeter’s competitor might manipulate the local
configuration to learn the private algorithm of the retargeter.
4 System Overview
We follow a distributed (in contrast to the currently centralized) approach where
a software agent running at the user’s device, called client, creates and maintains
user profile, as well as computes a score for each visited product. These scores
allow retargeters to select ads and to adjust their advertising prices to the user.
At a high level, the protocol works as follows (Figure 1)2:
2 Note that most values that are processed in the protocol are encrypted. We ignore
this aspect at this stage for simplicity.
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Fig. 1. System overview
1. The retargeting advertiser builds product feeds for the retargeter in which
it specifies the products to be advertised. The advertiser and the retargeter
agree on a range of advertising details for each product such as product qual-
ity (e.g., inferred from the number of users showing interest in the product),
user targeting criteria and ad pricing3. These details are encoded for each
product as a product profile and embedded into the advertiser’s web pages.
2. When a user visits a commercial web page (which belongs to a retargeting
advertiser, e.g. hotels.com) looking for a product, the client retrieves the
product profile from the page.
3. The client then computes the score of this product by matching the product
profile with the user profile. This score gives an estimation of the expected
revenue of the retargeter from advertising this product to the user, and
therefore shows whether this product is a good candidate for retargeting or
not.
4. The client selects the products having the highest scores, called top-products,
for each retargeter that it encountered.
5. When the user visits a publisher’s page (e.g., accuweather.com), which con-
tains an advertising frame, he sends the top m (say m = 3) product ids
and scores of each retargeter to the ADX4. The ADX initiates the RTB
auction among all retargeters by distributing the top-products of each retar-
geter. Based on the scores of the user’s top products, each retargeter decides
whether to serve an ad to the user and at what price, and sends the bid to the
3 These details can be set by advertisers or suggested by retargeters.
4 We assume a mechanism such that retargeters notify users of which ADXs they are
currently working with (e.g. by putting this information on a website accessible to
clients). The client only includes products of the related retargeters when it detects
an ADX.
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ADX. Finally, the ADX puts the winner’s ad creative on the publisher’s web
page; the ad creative anonymously loads ads from the retargeter through a
proxy mechanism at the ADX.
As product profiles are considered as commercially sensitive information, they
are encrypted by retargeters using a homomorphic encryption scheme such that
users cannot access the profile attributes. In order to select the highest scored
products, the client invokes the ranking service of each retargeter. In particular,
the client sends the list of encrypted scores to the ranking service in a way
(described later) that leaks neither the list of products nor the user profile to
the retargeter. The ranking service decrypts the scores, sorts them, and sends
back the sorted list of encrypted scores to the user.
The ADX does not include any user cookie (or user identifying information)
into bid requests as in today’s RTB protocol. Meanwhile, the top products sent to
retargeters are encrypted and therefore inaccessible to the ADX. Retargeting ads
are loaded through a proxy mechanism at the ADX and similarly are encrypted
in order to prevent the ADX from learning their content. Note that our scheme
requires that retargeters buy ad spaces from publishers only through ADX5.
5 System Details
5.1 Product Score Evaluation
We present our approach to compute product scores in the Cost-Per-Click (CPC)
model, i.e., advertisers only pay retargeters when users click on ads. A similar
approach can be applied to other models such as Cost-Per-Mile or Cost-Per-
Action. In CPC, the retargeter’s expected revenue from advertising a product
P to a user U is calculated as CTRU (P ) × CPC(P ), where CTRU (P ) is the
estimated Click-Through-Rate (CTR) of the ad shown to this user, and CPC(P )
is the price that the advertiser pays for an ad click. The product score in our
scheme is defined as this expected revenue.
We assume that each product P has a default CTR, denoted by CTR(P ), and
computed by a retargeter R, e.g., based on the click history of similar products.
A product initial score (PIS) of P is calculated as PIS = CTR(P )× CPC(P ),
which is independent of users. R targets users based on a set of user attributes
such as {gender , age, interests, location}. Example values of these attributes are
{“male”, “24 − 35”, “sport”, “Paris”}. For each of these attribute values, such
as male, R quantifies its effect on the CTR of P by an impact factor, such as
1.2, indicating that advertising P to a male user would increase P ’s CTR by
20%. Impact factors can be learned from statistics, e.g., by analyzing the CTR
5 We believe this requirement is reasonable: major retargeters (e.g. AdRoll, Criteo)
are actually partners with major ad exchanges (e.g. DoubleClick, RightMedia, Face-
booke, etc.) for their indirect buying through RTB [18][16][17], and start embracing
Preferred Deals as an efficient technique for their direct buying relationships with
publishers [19][20][21][22].
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of similar products when being advertised to male. The impact factor which is
larger/smaller than 1 increases/decreases P ’s CTR. If the retargeter does not
have sufficient statistics to measure an impact factor, it sets that to a default
value (e.g., 1).
The retargeter R configures, for each product, the initial score PIS and the
impact factors for all possible values of each user attribute. These properties are
then encrypted by R’s symmetric key using a homomorphic encryption scheme
such that a user can select the encrypted impact factors corresponding to his
profile (e.g., a male user picks the encrypted impact factor for male) without
knowing their values. The user performs this selection and then computes the
product score using the (encrypted) PIS and the selected (encrypted) impact
factors. In the following, we describe the details of our approach.
Encoding User and Product Profiles. The user attributes in our scheme
include age, gender, location and interest categories. In addition, they can also
include three extra attributes that are different for each product: user conver-
sion status (e.g., the product was put into shopping cart but not purchased),
frequency of visits (e.g., visits per day) and time of last visit (e.g., last hour
or last day)6. Note that this list is not exhaustive: additional attributes can be
added depending on specific targeting purposes.
– User profile: A user profile is described by a vector U where each coordi-
nate encodes the value of one user attribute. Specifically, each coordinate is
the index of the value of the corresponding attribute in its value set. An ex-
ample of a user profile is U = (1, 0, 89, 1, 2, 2, 3) where each coordinate may
encode (1 : “18 − 24”(age), 0 : “male”(gender), 89 : “Madrid”(location), 1 :
“computer science”(interest), 2 : “in shopping cart”(conversion status), 2 :
“10 visits/day”(frequency), 3 : “last week”(last visit)).
– Product profile: A product profile belonging to a retargeter R includes (1)
the ids of P and R (idP and idR, resp.); (2) PIS; (3) a url of R’s ranking
service (see later); (4) a set of vectors {F1, ..., Fn}, where each corresponds
to a user attribute and contains impact factors for all possible values of that
attribute. Given the previous example, F2 corresponds to gender, while F2[1]
and F2[2] are the impact factors of male and female, respectively.
7
Computing Score. For each attribute i, the client uses U [i] to pick one impact
factor from Fi, namely Fi[U [i]]. The score S
R
P for product P , which belongs to
a retargeter R, is computed as follows:
6 Users who put the product into shopping cart are more likely to make a purchase
than those only looking at the product. Larger visit frequency usually anticipates a
purchase. Similarly, recently visited products are more likely to be purchased.
7 Note that all values of the impact factors are converted to integer by using the micro
format (e.g., 1 is converted to 1, 000, 000 micros). The micro format is commonly
used in the advertising industry.
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SRP = PIS
R
P ×
n∏
i=1
Fi[U [i]] (1)
Although this formula can be computed using a multiplicative homomorphic
encryption scheme8, such as El-Gammal [32], such asymmetric encryption is too
costly in practice. We, instead, use an additive homomorphic encryption scheme
based on symmetric keys, which is proposed in [15] (Appendix), for its efficiency.
Hence, we convert Formula 1 to additive form by taking the logarithm of both
sides and use the resulting formula with the additive scheme:
logSRP = log PIS
R
P +
n∑
i=1
logFi[U [i]] (2)
For all i, R encrypts the logarithm of Fi such that each coordinate of Fi
is encrypted with a different key. Specifically, for any Fi, R computes F
E
i =
(Encki,1(logFi[1]), . . . ,Encki,|Fi|(logFi[|Fi|])) where ki,j = Hash(idP |K|i|j) and
K is the secret key of R. In addition, R computes EnckPIS (log PIS
R
P ), where
kPIS = Hash(idP |K|“PIS”).
To compute the product score, the user simply applies Formula 2 but in the
encrypted domain, i.e.,
EnckPIS (log PIS
R
P ) +
n∑
i=1
FEi [U [i]] = EnckPIS+
∑n
i=1 ki,U[i]
(logSRP ) (3)
where the equality follows from the homomorphic property of Enc [15]. The
product score can be retrieved by taking the exponent of the decrypted value.
5.2 Product Ranking
The client needs to rank products belonging to the related retargeter R when
it encounters a new product profile. Alternatively, it can perform the ranking
periodically (e.g., hourly) in case new products are frequently recorded. Recall
that the URL of the ranking service is included in each product profile of R.
To rank a set of products, the client sends the list of product scores, computed
in Formula 3, to the ranking service of R. However, in order to decrypt this score,
R would need the set of keys
∑
i ki,U [i], which eventually reveals the user profile
U . We instead follow a popular approach [11][14] and propose to implement the
whole ranking procedure using a secure co-processor (SC) (e.g., IBM 4765 [24]),
which provides secure storage as well as trustworthy, programmable execution
environment. The SC could be deployed at R, and users can verify the code being
8 An encryption scheme, denote by Enc, is additive homomorphic if, given two ar-
bitrary plaintexts m1 and m2, it allows computing Enc(m1 + m2) from Enc(m1)
and Enc(m2) without decrypting any of these values. Similarly, the scheme is mul-
tiplicative homomorphic if it allows computing Enc(m1 ∗m2) from the ciphertexts
Enc(m1) and Enc(m2).
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executed on the SC through a remote code attestation mechanism (e.g., [13]).
As the SC is tamper-resistant, while the communication between the client and
the SC is encrypted, no other parties (including R) will learn anything about
user profiles and top-products.
The ranking algorithm is simple and can be public. In particular, R installs
K and the public ranking procedure on the SC. Afterwards, the client establishes
a secure connection to the SC (e.g., through TLS), and sends U , as well as idP
with EnckPIS+
∑
i ki,U[i]
(logSRP ) for the related products to the SC. Then, the SC
can decrypt product scores, rank these products, and send back the sorted list
of product ids to the client.
5.3 Ad Serving
The client sends ad requests, which include the top products’ ids, idRs (retar-
geter ids), PIS and scores, to the ADX. Note that, as opposed to what in current
RTB systems, ad requests in our scheme do not contain any cookie. The ADX
uses idRs to separate the top-products for each retargeter and includes them
along with the user’s visiting page in related bid requests sent to appropriate
retargeters. Each retargeter R decrypts the product scores and adjusts these
scores according to the quality and relevance of the visiting page. If there is a
difference between the PIS of a product and the latest PIS at the retargeter
(e.g. due to a CPC change), it updates the product score accordingly. R then
selects the product with highest score and determine the bid price based on the
score. Subsequently, R builds an ad creative which contains the ad url to load
ad for this product from its server, and then includes the creative and the bid
price in a bid response which is sent to the ADX.
If R wins the auction, its ad creative is sent to the user’s device. Note that
current ADXs mostly allow these creatives to load ads directly from the retar-
geter’s server or from the ADX’ storage which contains retargeters’ pre-uploaded
ads. Both approaches do not protect user privacy: while the former exposes user
IP address to the retargeter, the latter reveals personalized ad content to the
ADX. In our scheme, we protect user privacy by requiring that ads be encrypted
by the retargeter and loaded through a proxy mechanism at the ADX. The
resulting computational and bandwidth overhead is analyzed in Section 7.
In particular, the ADX replaces the ad url in R’s ad creative with a url point-
ing to the ADX which contains the original url as value of a HTTP parameter. At
the user’s device, the creative requests the ad from the ADX; the ADX retrieves
the retargeter’s ad url, loads the ad from the retargeter, and then returns the ad
to the user. The ad view or click report is sent to the ADX, which subsequently
removes any user related information (e.g. IP address, browser info, etc.) and
forwards the report to the retargeter.
Protecting Ad Requests and Content: The product ids (in ad requests) or the ad
content could reveal the user’s top products to the ADX. In order to protect these
data, we use a symmetric key which is shared between the retargeter and the
client. In particular, before sending an ad request, the client generates a session
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key Ku,R for each retargeter R whose products are selected for the request. The
client then encrypts each session key with the public key of the corresponding
retargeter and includes the resulting encrypted key in the ad request. The ADX
subsequently includes the encrypted keys in bid requests. R first decrypts Ku,R
with its private key and then decrypts the top-products’ ids with Ku,R. Ku,R is
also used by R to encrypt the ad content for the client if R wins the auction.
5.4 Other Features
Frequency Capping: Frequency capping restricts the number of times an ad is
shown to the same user (e.g., less than 10 times per day). This is solved trivially
in our scheme: the client counts the number of times a product is advertised
to the user, and ignores a product when building ad requests if its counter is
beyond a threshold.
Click Fraud Defense: Since the click report is anonymized (by the proxy mecha-
nism at the ADX), this makes the click fraud more difficult to detect. However,
a similar approach to [8] could be applied: the retargeter sends suspected click
reports to the ADX; the ADX traces back to the user IPs which are responsible
to these clicks to examine the probability of click fraud.
6 Privacy Analysis
In this section, we analyze how user privacy is protected from retargeters, ad
exchanges, advertisers, and other users. We also analyze how the confidentiality
of the retargeter’s ad selection algorithm is guaranteed.
6.1 Retargeter
A retargeter R might get user information from bid requests or ranking requests.
Although R gets top-products from bid requests, it cannot associate them with
user identifying information such as the IP address (which is not included in
bid requests). Contrarily, while R can see the user IP from ranking requests, it
is not able to get any related user data since these requests are received and
processed by the SC through a secure connection. The tamper-proof property
of SC prevents R from intercepting and learning any internal data during the
ranking process. In summary, R unlinkably gets users’ top products (from bid
requests) and users’ IP addresses (from ranking requests).
Without covert channel or collusion, R cannot break user anonymity unless
it can correlate ranking requests with bid requests, e.g., if there are too few
users, or ranking request time correlates with bid request time. Although both
attacks seem impractical with large number of users (which is likely the case),
the time correlation attack can be further mitigated by randomizing the time of
ranking requests.
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Nevertheless, R might attempt to link users’ top products from different bid
requests and gradually build unique profiles of users (linkability). This would
be difficult given that the client sends only a small number of top-products in
ad requests. A possible attack is to infer user attribute values from the product
scores and then use them as a fingerprint to link different top products. This,
however, can be mitigated by coarsening score values at ranking (performed
inside the SC) and then using these coarsened values in ad requests.
Although R can hardly break user anonymity or profile unlinkability if it
faithfully follows the protocol, it might collude with other parties in order to
do that. Recall that we assume non-collusion between ADX and R (Section 3).
Other parties that might (and in fact have motivation to) collude with R are
the advertiser and the publisher.
Assume that R colludes with a malicious advertiser. For example, the adver-
tiser might send all its log entry database (possibly containing visited products,
time of visits, and the user IP address of every visit) to R. In order to link bid
requests, which likely contain products from other advertisers, with IP addresses
from this database, R may perform timing or product frequency analysis.
– Timing analysis: R correlates the visiting time related to a product (in the
malicious advertiser’s database) with the reception time of a bid request
(e.g., if they are close, both events are possibly originated from the same
IP). However, as discussed previously, time-based correlation is difficult due
to the large number of users. In addition, it is hard to predict the interval
between a visit to an advertiser’s page and a visit to a publisher’s page.
– Product frequency analysis: R selects products from the database which were
visited by a small number of users, ideally only by a single user (identified by
IP address). If a bid request contains any of these products, R can associate
it with a small group of users, or a single user, accordingly. Though this
attack is possible, it can only affect a very small proportion of users. In
addition, in this form of attack, R cannot actively target a victim.
The timing attack would be more practical if R colludes with a malicious
publisher, as the time of a visit to a publisher page is very close to the time
of the resulting bid request. However, this only works in case of very small
publishers which have few connecting users at a time. In addition, the client can
add some arbitrary delays in sending bid requests in order to mitigate the risk
of such attack.
6.2 Ad Exchange
Although the ADX can see the user’s IP address, it cannot obtain the list of top-
products or ad content; they are encrypted using the session key shared between
the user and the retargeter. The ADX cannot forge fake session keys in order
to decrypt retargeting ads served through its proxy mechanism. In particular, if
a fake session key is produced, the retargeter cannot get the right product ids
from the related request.
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Notice that, as part of the RTB protocol, ADXs can still get urls of visited
sites in our solution. Nevertheless, the risk of profiling users using these urls is
less severe than that in retargeting (Section 3). Moreover, users can block cookies
to prevent possible tracking performed by the ADX; our scheme works without
the need of any tracking cookie. In this work, we focus on the privacy risks of
retargeting, and leave the total elimination of this url leakage towards the ADX
for our future work.
6.3 Advertiser
In our system, an ad click brings the user directly to the advertiser’s site, the
same as what is happening today. We acknowledge that this is a problem since
advertisers can leverage fine-grained targeting feature and high user profiling
quality in our scheme to learn more information about users than what they
can learn in today’s system. One solution could be to handle post-click sessions
through an anonymized network, such as TOR [30]. This might, however, lead
to additional network latency, complexity in measuring ad performance or other
implication, and therefore need deeper analysis from the research community
and the advertising industry.
6.4 User
Targeted ads were proved to be a potential source of leaking user private infor-
mation due to its personalized content [25]. In case of retargeting ads, someone
happens to look at a user’s screen when he is browsing the web in a public place
(e.g. at work) may infer his previous private actions (e.g. at home)9 that the user
may want to keep secret (e.g. looking for an engagement ring). Since user profiles
in our scheme are built and stored locally, users can trivially filter out sensitive
products to prevent such unexpected information leakage. The encryption of
transmitted data also prevents eavesdroppers from exploiting personalized ad
content thereby inferring user private information.
The client can be malicious toward a retargeter R. For example, one of R’s
competitors might install and manipulate a client in order to learn product pro-
files of R. Since the used encryption scheme is proved to be perfectly secure [15]
(Appendix), only R can decrypt its product profiles. Nevertheless, a malicious
client may attempt to manipulate its own user profile to observe possible changes
in the ranking list and thereby inferring some properties of the product profiles.
This kind of attack needs to be repeated many times in order to learn mean-
ingful results. Consequently, it can be mitigated by applying a threshold on the
number of ranking requests per client. Furthermore, the ranking service on the
SC may apply a randomization in the order of top-products to make such kind
of attacks more difficult, if not impossible.
9 We assume that the user is using the same laptop computer in both environments.
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7 Implementation and Evaluation
7.1 Implementation
To build the client, we extend the Firefox plugin HttpFox [28] and use SQLite
for storing local data. The Ad Exchange and the Retargeter are written using
NodeJS [31]. Note that the ranking service, which is supposed to be implemented
on a SC, is implemented in NodeJS and executed by a normal processor in our
implementation. We ran our client inside a Firefox browser on a laptop running
OS X 10.7.2 on an Intel Core i5 2.4 GHz, and the retargeter and ad exchange
on a machine with an Intel Core 2 Duo 2.66 GHz and running Ubuntu 11.04.
Based on Google Ads Settings [23], we configure the system with 2 genders,
7 age ranges, 24 top interests and 846 word localities. The user conversion sta-
tus, the frequency of visits, and the time of last visit are all configured with 5
permissive values. The client stores up to 1000 products (for all retargeters) and
includes 3 products per retargeter in each ad request.
7.2 Evaluation
We evaluate, in this section, the computational and bandwidth overhead of our
scheme (compared to the existing system) through an example scenario.
Example scenario: A retargeter R provides retargeting services for 100 advertis-
ers, each having 1000 retargeting products. Each day there are 1 million unique
users browsing these advertisers’ websites (10K users per site on average). Each
user browses for 20 retargeting products which belong to 3 retargeters on aver-
age, and issues 20 ad requests containing such products, per day. Ad requests are
handled by a single Ad Exchange (ADX), resulting in 20 millions requests per
day (about 232 requests per second) received by the ADX. For each ad request,
the ADX sends bid requests to all retargeters whose products are contained in
the ad request. The retargeter R submits bid responses for all 20 millions bid
requests, wins about 10% of these auctions (2 millions winning times).
Computational Overhead. Our client can perform 5K homomorphic compu-
tations per second. It can generate 200 session keys (encrypted by R’s public
key) and 30 ad encryptions per second. With a few dozen score computations
and ad requests per day, the computation at client causes a negligible overhead.
Our retargeter can perform 133 product encryptions, 100K score decryptions,
and 6K ad encryptions per second. The computational overhead of the retargeter
(per day) is shown in Table 1. In this table, (1)(the first line) is estimated in
the worse case (the retargeter re-encrypts all 100K products everyday), while
(3) can be significantly optimized by offloading asymmetric operations using
dedicated hardware [9]. With our implementation, assuming that the retargeter
rents computation resources from Amazon EC2 [7] (e.g., using a c3.large instance
which is optimized for computation purposes), the total computational overhead
costs about $0.45 per day.
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Table 1. Computational overhead at retargeter (per day)
Index Action Time (hours)
1 Encrypting 100K products on advertisers’ websites 0.21
2 Decrypting 60M scores in bid requests 0.83
3 Decrypting 2M session keys 1.23
4 Encrypting 2M ads with session keys 0.46
5 Processing 20M ranking requests 0.33
Total 3.06
Table 2. Bandwidth overhead at ADX and retargeter (per day)
ADX Retargeter
Index Action Bwth Action Bwth
1 Receiving 20M ad requests 53GB Receiving 20M bid requests 18GB
2 Sending 60M bid requests 53GB Receiving 20M ranking requests 35GB
3 Proxying 10M retargeting ads 190GB
Bandwidth and Storage Overhead. Each product profile increases the size
of the product web page by 6 KB. This is a negligible overhead given the fact
that, for example, a maty.com’s product page’s html source is around 100 KB,
excluding images, css and javascript files. The sizes of an ad request and a ranking
request are 23.94 KB and 15.96 KB, respectively. The total bandwidth overhead
for each user is therefore approximately 2 MB per day. The products stored at
a user’s device (maximum 1K) cause a maximum 8MB local storage.
The bandwidth overhead at the ADX and the retargeter are presented in
Table 2. In order to provide an estimation of the resulting cost, we assume that
both the retargeter and the ADX run their software on Amazon EC2’s servers.
Amazon EC2 only charges the bandwidth from EC2 to the Internet, which is
related to ads served by the ADX to users. If we apply the upper bound of this
price, namely $0.12 per GB, the bandwidth overhead resulting from serving ads
(190 GB) costs the ADX approximately $22.8 per day ($2.28∗10−6 per ad). This
additional cost can be shared among retargeters, advertisers, and publishers, for
example by the ADX slightly increasing the transaction commission. Given the
significant number of advertisers and publishers working with an ADX in general,
the cost per entity would become negligible.
8 Discussion
8.1 Compatibility
Our purpose is not to replace but rather complement the current retargeting
system by providing an alternative solution for retargeters (and ad exchanges)
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to provide retargeting ad service in a privacy-preserving manner. An example
scenario would be as follows. The retargeters choose privacy-preserving (our
scheme) or regular (current scheme) RTB mode at the ADX. At auction, the
ADX sends privacy-preserving retargeting bid requests (as described in our
scheme) to privacy-advocate retargeters, and regular bid requests to the others.
The ADXs which support our scheme specify this in their ad requests (e.g., by
using a special HTTP header, such as “PPRetargeting = true”). The client10
intercepts and includes into these requests the respective user’s top retargeting
products. If users do not favor traditional retargeting or RTB, they can, for
example, configure the web browser to disable third-party cookies.
8.2 Scoring Algorithm
The score computation (i.e., CPC(P ) × CTR(P ) ×
n∏
i=1
Fi), is based on an as-
sumption that the effect of user attributes on the product’s CTR are indepen-
dent of each other. Consequently, this algorithm has a limitation: it does not
take into account the intrinsic correlation between user attributes. For example,
say a user’s age “18-24” and interest “sport”, each increasing a product’s CTR
with 1.2 (20%) and 1.1 (10%), respectively, a combination of them might not
necessarily be equal to 1.2 × 1.1 = 1.32, but can be higher or lower than that
depending on the correlation between the two attributes. In the following, we
discuss a possible extension that takes into account this correlation.
Attribute Coefficients: We assume that the correlation between two attributes Fi
(e.g., age) and Fj (e.g., gender) can be quantified by a coefficient Cij , so that their
combined effect on a product’s CTR is computed as Fi×Fj ×Cij . Each Cij can
be defined with different values for different value ranges of Fi and Fj . The score
in this case would be computed as: CPC(P )× CTR(P )×
n∏
i=1
Fi ×
∏
i,j
Cij . Note
that the correlation coefficient can be computed for more than two attributes,
e.g., Cijk or Cijkl. In the worse case, the size of the coefficient set is equal to the
number of all possible combinations of attribute values. The coefficient values
are also encrypted by the retargeter, and their applied attribute ranges can be
defined in a script encoded into the product profile.
8.3 Gathering Statistics
User statistics (e.g., click behaviors of a group of users) are important for retar-
geters to enhance their retargeting performance. In our scheme, the SC can also
be used to aggregate this information in a privacy-preserving manner. In partic-
ular, after an interval (e.g., a week), the client sends the user’s profile and CTRs
of local products to the SC (through a secure connection). The SC aggregates
10 Privacy-advocate retargeters and ADXs encourage users to use the client software.
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these data from a sufficient number of users, produces statistical results (e.g., av-
erage CTR of a product advertised to sport-enthusiastic users), and sends them
to the retargeter.
9 Related Work
There have been several research proposals aimed at designing a privacy-preserving
targeted advertising system. Nevertheless, none of them address privacy prob-
lems in retargeting or consider RTB in their design. In the following, we survey
these proposals and analyze their differences from ours.
Saikat et al. proposed Privad [8]. In their design, a client software builds
the user profile locally, a dealer acts as an anonymizing proxy to mediate the
communication between users and ad brokers, while the communication is pro-
tected from the dealer with the public keys of ad brokers. Privad uses a publish-
subscribe mechanism for ad delivery: the ad broker transmits ads to users accord-
ing to their subscribed coarse-grained information (e.g., generic interest category
such as “sport”), the ads are cached at the user’s device, and the local software
selects ads that best match the user profile when encountering an ad box. Since
the client in Privad is implemented as an untrusted black box, a reference mon-
itor is needed to gauge the traffic between the client and the network.
The publish-subscribe and ad caching mechanism in Privad is not appropri-
ate to real-time auctions in RTB, in which ads and bid prices are dynamically
selected at real-time. Our approach is somewhat similar to Privad in terms of
using a proxy to protect user anonymity. However, while Privad requires an ad-
ditional party, the dealer, whose incentive and business model are not clear, we
leverage an existing entity, the ad exchange, and its RTB protocol, which plays
an important role in the current ad system.
Moreover, Privad does not detail how to protect the ad selection algorithm
of ad brokers from users. In addition, as the client is untrusted, it would be
difficult (e.g., might require significant human intervention) to prevent the client
from bypassing the reference monitor to leak user information to the network
(e.g., through semantic means). Furthermore, in Privad, as a client software is
provided by an ad broker, each user might have to install as many clients as
the number of ad brokers. This requirement imposes an important barrier for
the entrance of new ad brokers. In our proposal, users trust the client (which
can be open-source) and therefore do not need a monitoring mechanism. We use
homomorphic encryption to allow the client to perform part of the retargeter’s
ad selection algorithm while protecting its confidentiality. Each user installs only
one software that can work with any retargeter which follows the protocol.
Adnostic [10] similarly profiles users locally but uses a different approach
for ad rendering. In Adnostic, the broker transmits a set of ads solely based
on the page that a user is currently visiting, and the local software selects ads
that best match the user profile to display to the user. Nevertheless, since only
a small number of ads are transmitted by ad brokers without any knowledge
about the user, the targeting performance in Adnostic is far from optimal. In
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addition, as the ad broker cannot see which ad is displayed to the user, it is
difficult to control frequency capping. Finally, this model is not suitable to RTB
which allows only one ad to be sent by a bidder in each auction. In our scheme,
we ensure fine-grained targeting, the frequency capping is solved trivially, and
RTB is supported.
Obliviad [11] aims to shift the current algorithms of ad brokers into secure co-
processors (SC). The user sends his profile in form of keywords to the SC through
a secure connection (e.g., TLS). The SC subsequently selects ads from the bro-
ker’s database using these keywords. Obliviad implements a PIR scheme over an
ORAM structure to hide all the database access patterns from the broker. One
similar characteristic between Obliviad and our proposal is the use of SC as a
trusted environment on the advertiser side. However, while Obliviad aims to im-
plement the whole broker’s ad selection algorithm inside the SC, we only leverage
the SC for a simple sorting algorithm. Note that, due to tamper-resistance re-
quirements, the SC is often significantly constrained in both computation ability
and memory capacity in comparison with host CPUs [34]. Our sorting algorithm
is extremely simple (i.e. decrypt and sort numbers), and therefore is easy to be
implemented inside the SC. In addition, similarly to Privad and Adnostic, it is
unclear how to adapt Obliviad to RTB. For example, it is apparently impractical
to make a TLS connection to the SC through a RTB auction.
RePriv [12] proposes a client-side framework for content providers to inject
their miners (in form of embedded codes) to run on the user’s terminal. These
miners collect user information according to specific purposes of each provider,
then customize the provided content accordingly. This approach can be applied
in our scheme, for example in building and maintaining user profiles.
10 Conclusion
Retargeting ads are growingly rampant and cause great privacy concerns, mostly
resulting from tracking user intents. In this work, we propose the first retarget-
ing system that does not rely on tracking. Our scheme leverages homomorphic
encryption to distribute the ad selection algorithm between the user and the
retargeter in a way that securely combines confidential data from both parties.
The proposed scheme is compatible with RTB and supports major characteris-
tics of current ad systems such as real-time auction, fine-grained targeting, ads
freshness and frequency capping.
This is, to our knowledge, the first work that considers RTB in a privacy-
preserving advertising solution. We note that RTB is increasingly prevalent and
plays an important role in today’s targeted advertising systems, itself expos-
ing serious privacy concerns [35]. Enhancing user privacy in RTB in general is
therefore our goal in a near future.
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Appendix: Additive Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
from [15]
Description
The main idea of the scheme is to replace the xor (Exclusive-OR) operation
typically found in stream ciphers with modular addition (+).
Additively Homomorphic Encryption Scheme
Encryption:
1. Represent message m as integer m ∈ [0,M − 1] where M is
a large integer
2. Let k be a randomly keystream, where k ∈ [0,M − 1]
3. Compute c = Enc(m, k,M) = m+ k (mod M).
Decryption:
1. Dec(c, k,M) = c− k (mod M)
Addition of Ciphertexts:
1. Let c1 = Enc(m1, k1,M) and c2 = Enc(m2, k2,M)
2. For k = k1 + k2, Dec(c1 + c2, k,M) = m1 +m2
Assume that 0 ≤ m < M . Due to the commutative property of addition, the
above scheme is additively homomorphic. In fact, if c1 = Enc(m1, k1,M) and
c2 = Enc(m2, k2,M) then c1 + c2 = Enc(m1 + m2, k1 + k2,M).
Note that if n different ciphers ci are added, then M must be larger than
n∑
i=1
mi, otherwise correctness is not provided. In fact if
n∑
i=1
mi is larger than
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M , decryption will result in a value m’ that is smaller than M . In practice, if
p = max(mi) then M should be selected as M = 2
log2(p∗n).
The keystream k can be generated by using a stream cipher, such as RC4,
generated from a private key.
Security Analysis
This additive homomorphic encryption scheme is very similar to a xor-based
stream cipher and its security can be proven using a similar proof.
The security relies on two important features: (1) the keystream changes
from one message to another and (2) all the operations are performed modulo
an integer M . These two features protect the scheme from frequency analysis
attacks. In fact, it can be proven that the scheme is perfectly secure.
Theorem 1 The previous encryption scheme is perfectly secure.
Proof. For plaintext space M , keystream space K, let K = |M |, m ∈ [0;M − 1],
c ∈ [0;M − 1]. Set k∗ = c−m (mod M). Then:
Prob
k←K
[Enc(k,m,M) = c] = Prob
k←K
[k + m = c (mod M)]
= Prob
k←K
[k = c−m (mod M)]
= Prob
k←K
[k = k∗]
(4)
If we assume that the maximum number of ciphertexts to be added is n
and that each plaintext is l-bit long, we must have M = 2l+log(n), i.e., |M | =
l + log(n). If ci = (mi + ki), then the probability that ci ∈ [0, 2l − 1] is twice
the probability that ci ∈ [2l;M − 1]. More specifically, we have: Prob
k←K
[k = k∗] =
1/(2l + M) if c > 2l and Prob
k←K
[k = k∗] = 2/(2l + M) if c < 2l.
Since these two equations hold for every m ∈ M, it follows that for every
m1,m2 ∈ M we have Prob
k←K
[Enc(k,m1,M) = c] = Prob
k←K
[Enc(k,m2,M) = c]
which establishes perfect security of the scheme.
